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ABSTRACT 
 
This article explores the relationship between the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”) and the relative labor market outcomes for people with disabilities. Using 
individual-level longitudinal data from 1981 to 1996 derived from the previously 
unexploited Panel Study of Income Dynamics (“PSID”), we examine the possible effect 
of the ADA on (1) annual weeks worked; (2) annual earnings; and (3) hourly wages for a 
sample of 7120 unique male household heads between the ages of 21 and 65 as well as a 
subset of 1437 individuals appearing every year from 1981 to 1996. Our analysis of the 
larger sample suggests the ADA had a negative impact on the employment levels of 
disabled persons relative to non-disabled persons but no impact on relative earnings. 
However, our evaluation of the restricted sample raises questions about these findings. 
Using these data, we find little evidence of adverse effects on weeks worked but strong 
evidence of wage declines for the disabled, albeit declines beginning in 1986, well before 
the ADA’s passage. These results therefore cast doubt on the adverse ADA-related 
impacts found in previous studies, particularly Acemoglu and Angrist (2001). The 
conflicting narratives that emerge from our analysis shed new light on, but also counsel 
caution in reaching final conclusions about, the impact of the ADA on employment 
outcomes for people with disabilities. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Research on the measurable effects of antidiscrimination initiatives indicates that 
numerous factors can impact the efficacy of civil rights statutes seeking to equalize 
opportunities for targeted groups.1 Gerald Rosenberg (1991), for example, has argued that 
judicial decisions alone were incapable of generating the major economic improvements 
for African-Americans that emerged around 1965. These economic gains were not simply 
the by-product of judicial decisions following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
but were instead generated by a comprehensive federal government enforcement effort, 
concentrated in the South, of related antidiscrimination policies that included voting 
rights and school desegregation (Butler and Heckman, 1977; Donohue and Heckman, 
1991; Heckman and Payner, 1989). 
A key congressional aspiration in enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”) was increasing labor market participation among disabled workers. In addition 
to prohibiting discriminatory action throughout the employment relationship, Title I 
compels employers to provide reasonable accommodations to “qualified” employees with 
disabilities.2 This reasonable accommodation mandate has become both a central defining 
feature of the ADA as an antidiscrimination statute for its advocates (Stein, 2004a) and a 
lightning rod for its critics (Epstein, 1992). 
The ADA set forth legislative findings documenting the widespread exclusion of 
people with disabilities from the workplace and expressing congressional intent to 
remedy that situation. But both the congressional and judicial support for the effort to 
incorporate the disabled more fully into the workforce has not been consistent and 
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comprehensive throughout the existence of the ADA (Stein and Stein, 2007).3 Indeed, for 
the first ten years after the ADA’s passage, the effectiveness of the statue was undercut 
by federal benefits rules that penalized disabled workers who secured employment by 
depriving them of their federal health care benefits or monetary supplements.4 Moreover, 
Congress has yet to enact a comprehensive jobs program for workers with disabilities 
similar to those passed for non-disabled benefit recipients during the mid-1990s welfare 
reform.5 Finally, while Congress did enact federal tax benefits designed to increase the 
employment of persons with disabilities, these tax credits have been profoundly 
underutilized (GAO, 2002). 
A growing debate has developed regarding the impact of the ADA on the 
employment of individuals with disabilities. Initial empirical studies comparing pre- and 
post-ADA employment data have painted a fairly dismal picture of disabled employees’ 
labor market participation, suggesting that the law may actually have impaired the 
employment prospects of its intended beneficiaries. Some recent studies have raised 
questions about this dire assessment, although both sides concede that post-ADA 
disability-related employment has not improved significantly. 
Achieving a greater understanding of post-ADA employment effects is of 
considerable importance both within and outside the United States. Notably, the ADA’s 
reasonable accommodation mandate has been adopted by the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,6 as well as the European Union’s Employment 
Framework Directive (an umbrella antidiscrimination policy) (European Union Council, 
2000). These enactments have considerably broadened interest in disability law and 
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policy, although it should still be noted that three-quarters of the world’s nations lack any 
relevant domestic statute or legal provision protecting the disabled from employment 
discrimination (Stein and Lord, 2008). 
This article reexamines the impact of the ADA on the employment and wages of 
disabled workers. We contribute to the literature in two important ways. First, we expand 
the period of observation to understand long-term trends in the employment status of the 
disabled. Second, unlike many of the earlier studies, we employ individual-level panel 
data to observe the same individuals before and after the adoption of the ADA. 
Expanding the timeframe and utilizing the longitudinal structure of our data improve our 
ability to identify the true impact of the ADA by controlling for pre-existing trends and 
compositional changes in the disabled population. At the same time, there is a cost to our 
approach since the size of our Panel Study of Income Dynamics (“PSID”) data set is 
small relative to the Current Population Survey (“CPS”), and when we restrict our sample 
to the same 1437 male, household-head workers over a sixteen-year data period, we 
sacrifice some statistical power to reduce compositional bias. 
To frame our discussion, Section II discusses the results of major studies on post-
ADA employment effects as well as data-related pitfalls left unaddressed in the literature. 
Section III sets forth our initial analysis from the PSID, a longitudinal data set that, to our 
knowledge, has not been previously used to explore Title I’s impact on the employment 
of the disabled. These data are unique in their ability to track the same individuals over 
time, from 1968 through 2007.7 Unlike the more frequently used CPS, PSID data allow 
us to chart the measured employment and earnings of the same disabled workers over a 
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broader span of time. Section IV presents the results from our regression-based analysis 
without imposing any extraordinary constraints on the data. We find that employment 
levels for the disabled relative to the non-disabled (when measured as the number of 
annual weeks worked) declined by about three weeks after 1994 (when Title I became 
fully enforceable) but that earnings (conditional on receipt) were not measurably affected. 
Section V adds the condition that individuals represented in the sample remain the same 
over time so that longitudinal estimates are perfectly comparable. Using this “restricted” 
dataset, we observe that the initial estimates are highly sensitive to whether one controls 
for individual fixed effects. Without such controls (see Column 1 in Table 6), a picture of 
substantial relative declines in weeks worked by the disabled emerges in the 1990s; with 
such controls, no such employment decline appears. 
These results are important for several reasons. First, they reinforce the growing 
evidence that econometric analyses of law and policy can yield quite different results 
across different data sets, years, and statistical models (Donohue and Wolfers, 2005). 
Second, we argue that the longitudinal data contained in the PSID reduces the 
confounding effect of compositional change, i.e., who self-identifies as “disabled” after 
disability laws change. In this regard, our approach can provide a cleaner estimate of the 
impact of the law on a given panel of workers over an extended period of time. This 
benefit does come at the cost of our diminished ability to observe the performance of 
younger disabled workers entering the market at about the time of the adoption of the 
ADA, as well as from our relatively small sample size.8 Finally, this article underscores 
the challenge confronting policymakers in crafting a disability policy that addresses the 
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difficult conditions confronting disabled male household heads in the modern American 
economy. Section VI concludes. 
II. Previous Studies 
 
A. Prior Literature 
Eighteen years after the ADA’s passage, most scholars agree that the employment 
rates of disabled workers have declined, although there is still contention over the extent 
of and reasons for this outcome. Some attribute the drop to the ADA itself and, in 
particular, to its reasonable accommodation mandate. (Jolls and Prescott, 2005; 
Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001; DeLeire, 2000a; DeLeire 2000b; Jolls 2000; Epstein, 
1992). A second group attributes the decline to factors other than the ADA. (Hotchkiss, 
2004; Houtenville and Burkhauser, 2004; Burkhauser and Stapleton, 2004; Hotchkiss, 
2003; Wittenberg and Maag, 2003; Beegle and Stock, 2003; Autor and Duggan, 2003; 
Blanck et al., 2003; Tolin and Patwell, 2003; Kaye, 2003; Bound and Waidmann, 2002; 
Burkhauser et al., 2001; McNeil, 2000; Schwochau and Blanck, 2000).9  
The ADA includes two key employment-related provisions: a prohibition on wage 
and employment discrimination against “qualified individuals with a disability” and a 
mandate that employers provide “reasonable accommodation” for those protected 
individuals in order to guarantee equal employment opportunities. Although a number of 
studies have found that pre-1990 Civil Rights laws increased the employment of the 
primary targeted group (for instance, African-American workers), those laws involved 
only an antidiscrimination component and did not include a reasonable accommodation 
requirement. (Heckman and Payner, 1989; Donohue and Heckman, 1991) Consequently, 
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when initial evaluations of relative post-ADA employment rates concluded that the law 
impaired the employment of workers with disabilities, the reasonable accommodation 
mandate was quickly identified as the likely culprit. 
Three major empirical studies have been central to the claim that the ADA’s 
reasonable accommodation mandate has caused a relative decrease in the post-ADA 
employment rate of persons with disabilities.10 Initially, DeLeire (2000a) examined the 
effect of the ADA on labor market opportunities for people with disabilities using data 
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (“SIPP”). Analyzing pooled panels 
of men aged eighteen to sixty-four, DeLeire found that employment of disabled men 
declined by about 7.2 percentage points from 1990 to 1995 and that the largest declines 
occurred “for workers in manufacturing industries, workers in blue-collar or managerial 
occupations, workers with physical or mental disabilities, and workers who became 
disabled for reasons besides a work-related injury.” However, he did not find any effect 
on the wages offered to disabled men.  
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) also investigated whether the intended employment 
protection of the ADA improved economic conditions for the disabled. Using CPS survey 
data for individuals aged twenty-one to fifty-eight during the period 1988-1997, 
Acemoglu and Angrist estimated the effect of the ADA on both weeks worked and log 
weekly earnings. For women and men under forty, they found an average annual decline 
in employment beginning in 1993 and 1992, respectively, ranging from 1.4 to 2.8 weeks. 
For those over forty, however, only men experienced a statistically significant drop in 
employment of 2.1 weeks. However, these effects for older men were attributed to 
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changes in transfer payments and disappeared once Supplementary Security Income 
(“SSI”) and Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) were included in the analysis. 
The wage regressions were more ambiguous: no consistent effect emerged for women, 
while the decline for men after 1993 disappeared when a linear trend was included. 
Although the articles by DeLeire and Acemoglu and Angrist are serious and 
careful studies by highly respected researchers, the authors faced the difficult challenge 
of identifying the effect of a uniformly imposed federal law such as the ADA using a 
simple before-after comparison in the employment experience of disabled individuals 
(Donohue and Heckman, 1991). By contrast, Jolls and Prescott (2005) attempted an 
alternative approach based on variations in disability law both across states and over 
time, thereby permitting a more nuanced assessment of treatment and control groups. 
Although they found a steady decline in employment levels among disabled workers 
during the 1990s relative to the period before the ADA’s passage, Jolls and Prescott’s 
work revealed no connection between declines from 1993-1994 and onward and whether 
the federal law was an innovation over preexisting state law protections. Any adverse 
outcomes for the disabled population were confined to the immediate post-passage 
period, before the ADA’s effective date, before employers’ attitudes about workers with 
disabilities could improve, and before the courts had defined more precisely the ADA’s 
requirements. Hotchkiss (2004) also exploited state-level variation in disability protection 
law to conclude that the ADA was not responsible for declining labor force participation 
rates among the disabled.  
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These leading studies assessing relative post-ADA employment rates using SIPP 
and CPS all reached the same conclusion that the statute has precipitated a decline in 
employment levels, although Jolls and Prescott found this effect to be limited to the short 
term. Moreover, all three studies (again, with Jolls and Prescott’s caveat regarding short- 
and long-term effects) concluded that the ADA’s reasonable accommodation mandate is 
the most likely cause of the relative decline in employment.  
More recent work, such as Burkhauser, Houtenville, and Rovba (2007), has raised 
questions about whether the observed decline in the employment of the disabled can be 
attributed to the ADA.  Burkhauser and his coauthors extend and refine the analysis of 
Acemoglu and Angrist in several important ways. After expanding the observation period 
from 1988-1997 to 1982-2004, Burkhauser, Houtenville, and Rovba conclude that the 
“decline in relative employment of working-age people with disabilities not only began 
well before the implementation of the ADA in 1992, but has continued long afterward.” 
B. Identifying Disabled Individuals 
 
When assessing the ADA’s impact, it is crucial to have a reliable measure of 
disability. Yet, since the enactment of the ADA, federal courts on numerous occasions 
have redefined who is covered by the statute.11 Accordingly, it is unsurprising that no 
clear and consistent measure exists of the disabled individuals protected by the ADA.12 
The CPS studies discussed above all use the survey’s responses to the work-disability 
question as a proxy for disability.13 This fact, in turn, raises several concerns, since the 
problems surrounding the work-disability question and similar survey questions have 
long been recognized (Hale, 2001).  
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To begin with, the CPS work-disability question was not intended to correspond 
to the definition of disability under the ADA (McNeil, 2000). In addition, it is at least 
possible that the composition of respondents who answer affirmatively to the work-
disability question changes over time in ways that would undermine the reliability of 
estimates of the effect of the law (Kirchner, 1996; Kruse and Schur, 2003). 
One can imagine two ways in which the presence of the law could influence self 
reports of disability.  On the one hand, some non-working individuals who did not 
previously identify themselves as disabled might now choose to do so in the wake of the 
advent of the law.  This could result from either greater awareness of the concept of 
disability in the workplace, a renewed sense that the disabled were discriminated against, 
or even hopes that re-characterizing oneself as disabled might lead to improved 
employment prospects once the law takes effect.  In this event, the "disabled" population 
would grow in a way that might be disproportionately augmented by those with poor 
prospects in the labor market.  The effect of this changing composition of the disabled 
would likely make the law look worse than it actually was. 
On the other hand, the passage of the ADA could also lead to a reduction in the 
number of those who self-reported as disabled.  This effect would operate if the 
accommodation provision of the ADA led disabled people to reject the notion that their 
health problem or disability prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount of 
work they can do (Kirchner, 1996). By having the people that receive accommodations 
under the ADA drop out of the population that answers the work-disability question 
affirmatively, one is potentially left with more severely disabled people that both have a 
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harder time finding employment and self-report a work disability. This compositional 
change would also bias the analysis towards findings of declining employment of the 
disabled population, even if there were a positive effect on employment from the ADA 
accommodation provision (Kruse and Schur, 2003). 
C. The Possible Sources of Data -- CPS, SIPP, and PSID 
 
The studies discussed above have relied on either the CPS or the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP).  Inevitably, different data sources have 
advantages and disadvantages.  In order to resolve deficiencies in the CPS, the U.S. 
Census Bureau originally established the SIPP to capture economic conditions at multiple 
times within a two and one-half year window. This aspect of the data instrument also 
relieved survey respondents from the task, required in the CPS, of remembering 
economic values or participation levels from up to twelve months prior to the survey.  
But these advantages of the SIPP are potentially offset in a study of disability in that   
SIPP interviewers only ask questions from the disability module between June and 
September of the first year in the panel window. Consequently, any changes in disability 
status that occur in months from successive waves are not captured.14  
The SIPP only modestly improves on the pure cross-sectional structure of the CPS 
in terms of allowing the researcher to follow the same individuals across time.  The 
PSID, which provides longitudinal data over a significant time span, represents a clear 
improvement in this dimension over the CPS and SIPP. Thus, it appears that clear 
tradeoffs exist when choosing among the three primary datasets capturing individual 
disability and employment status. The level of detail in the SIPP makes it more attractive 
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than the vague questions in the CPS and PSID. The SIPP’s major flaw in terms of 
disability reporting, however, is a failure to ask the question in the second and third years 
covered by each panel, which compromises reporting accuracy. Only the PSID data allow 
for reliable monitoring of individuals over time and thus for observing changes in 
disability status that may be attributed to passage of the ADA (albeit with a vague 
question about disability).  With these advantages and disadvantages in mind, we turn to 
our study, which is the first evaluation of the impact of the ADA to use the PSID. 
 
III. Our Analysis Using PSID Data 
 
The PSID data appear in two formats: a year-by-year family file in which most of 
the survey questions pertain to the household head and a cross-year individual file with 
information on each household member. We create our dataset by matching the 
individual-level file to the family-level version for the years 1981 to 1997 and restricting 
observations to household heads (because survey questions regarding most variables of 
interest, including disability status, are asked only of the household head).15 
Our initial matching algorithm yields longitudinal data for 18,342 individuals 
comprising 107,844 person-year observations. We then restrict this sample to male 
household heads between the ages 21 and 65 to explore the labor market behavior of 
those most persistently attached to the labor force.16 After imposing these restrictions, our 
operational dataset consists of 7120 individuals observed in at least one year during the 
period 1981 to 1996 (a total of 64,607 person-year observations). Our analysis will 
compare white versus non-white individuals.17 
14 
 
Tables 1 and 2 report summary statistics for two versions of the operational 
dataset: one for the overall “unrestricted” sample of 7120 individuals and another 
describing the “restricted” sample, the 1437 individuals appearing each year from 1981 to 
1996. The PSID question used to identify disability status among heads of households is: 
“Do you . . . have any physical or nervous condition that limits the type of work or the 
amount of work you can do?”18 A χ2 test for the equality of means in each sample 
indicates that the two groups are statistically indistinguishable with the sole exception of 
state unemployment rates, the difference between which is marginally different from zero 
at the 5% level. 
On average, the male household heads in our sample report being disabled 13% 
and 12% of the time in the unrestricted and restricted datasets, respectively.19 Note that 
this is different from the claim that 12-13% of the household heads in our data are 
disabled, since, as we show, disability reports can vary over time for the same individual. 
In the unrestricted (restricted) data about 4889 (884) people, or 69% (62%) never report a 
disability, while only 21 individuals, or less than 1%, report having a disability each year 
they appear in the restricted dataset. 
With respect to average employment, PSID interviewees held jobs 85% of the 
time when the interview was conducted. This response variable reflects answers to a 
question about current employment status and, as a result, potentially understates the 
extent of employment during the data collection year. The effects of relying on this 
variable for analyzing the impact of the ADA in a multiple regression framework are 
discussed in the next section. We therefore use an alternative measure of annual 
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employment available in the PSID survey: annual weeks worked, which is asked 
retrospectively of respondents.20 Over the sixteen-year period of observation, individuals 
averaged approximately 41 weeks worked per year. Converting nominal earnings to 
constant 2000 dollars, we find that (unconditional) average annual wages and salaries 
amounted to just over $31,000, while the average real hourly wage was approximately 
$17. 
Turning to demographic characteristics, we find that 70% of the men in our 
dataset were white and that average age over the period 1981-1996 was 39 years. Thirty-
seven percent of our sample had obtained only a high school degree, while another 21% 
had some college, and another 14% had at least a college degree. Finally, we collected 
data on unemployment rates to proxy for economic conditions in each state in which 
PSID participants resided; the average across states and years was just under 7%. 
Figure 1A provides information on the percentage of individuals reporting a 
disability over the duration of our observation period. Since natural aging and continuing 
exposure to potentially disabling disease or injury will tend to drive this proportion 
upward, we separate the data into three cohorts defined by age reported in 1981. As 
expected, the disabled share in each cohort increases from 1981 to 1996, and the older 
initial cohorts have higher rates of disability. Note that the share of disabled persons in 
the cohort aged 40 to 65 rises from roughly 20% to 30% by 1996. The cohorts aged 21 to 
39, on the other hand, begin with a much lower rate of disability closer to 5% in 1981, 
rising to 16% in the final year of observation.21 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (Unrestricted Dataset) 
Variable Number of Observations Mean Standard Deviation 
Currently disabled 64,525 0.13 0.34 
Currently employed 64,601 0.85 0.36 
Annual weeks worked 56,465 40.79 16.94 
Real annual wages (2000) 63,629 31,055 36,151 
Real hourly wages (2000) 48,832 17.29 33.30 
Age 64,607 39.16 11.20 
White 64,607 0.70 0.46 
Less than high school education 64,607 0.20 0.40 
High school graduate 64,607 0.37 0.48 
Some college education 64,607 0.21 0.40 
College graduate 64,607 0.14 0.35 
Some postgraduate study 64,607 0.08 0.27 
State unemployment rate 63,190 6.78 1.98 
Sources: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1981-1996 and the United States Statistical Abstract for 
unemployment. 
Note: The incidence of disability is measured using the PSID’s work limitation question. 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics (Restricted Dataset) 
Variable Number of Observations Mean Standard Deviation 
Currently disabled 22,974 0.12 0.33 
Currently employed 22,992 0.90 0.30 
Annual weeks worked 20,521 43.34 14.03 
Real annual wages (2000) 22,790 37,508 41,593 
Real hourly wages (2000) 18,759 19.23 22.18 
Age 22,992 40.77 9.04 
White 22,992 0.78 0.41 
Less than high school education 22,992 0.14 0.35 
High school graduate 22,992 0.35 0.48 
Some college education 22,992 0.22 0.41 
College graduate 22,992 0.17 0.38 
Some postgraduate study 22,992 0.12 0.32 
State unemployment rate 22,869 6.81 2.08 
Sources: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1981-1996 and the United States Statistical Abstract for 
unemployment. 
Note: The incidence of disability is measured using the PSID’s work limitation question. 
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Figure 1A: Percentage disabled by 1981 age cohort (1981 - 1996) 
 
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
 
Figure 1B portrays the evolution of cohort disability shares when we fix the age 
groups but allow their members to change over time at five-year intervals. If the 
relationship between age and disability shifted significantly between 1981 and 1996, then 
our empirical model should control for this phenomenon accordingly. However, all five 
curves in Figure 1B suggest that disability shares were relatively constant comparing 
1981 and 1996, albeit with some intervening swings over time within each cohort.  The 
biggest shifts across the endpoints of the entire 1981 through 1996 period were the 
increase in disability experienced by the 21-25 and 51-55 age cohorts, and the decrease 
in disability for the 41-45 age cohort. 
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Figure 1B: Percentage disabled by age cohort in five-year intervals (1981 - 1996) 
 
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
 
 
Figures 2 through 5 document changes in employment and wage levels by 
disability status. As such, they represent the starting point for our inquiry into the labor 
market effects of the ADA on the disabled population relative to non-disabled people. 
Figure 2 shows that between 1981 and 1996 the percentage of non-disabled individuals 
with jobs remained high and relatively constant at about 90%, while employment in the 
disabled community fell during the 1990s from a peak of nearly 60% in 1988 to about 
52% by 1996. Given that the ADA was signed into law on July 26, 1990, this 
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deterioration in the employment levels of the disabled appears to begin just prior to 
enactment and continues through the early years of ADA enforcement before showing 
signs of reversal after 1994. At first glance, then, this simple graphical depiction  
intimates that disabled individuals may have faced increasing employment obstacles 
under the ADA regime, while the non-disabled labor force was largely unaffected. 
Figure 2: Percentage employed by disability status (1981 - 1996) 
 
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
 
Figure 3 provides a somewhat finer measure of participation by showing the 
average number of annual weeks worked over time for disabled and non-disabled 
individuals.22 Average weeks worked for the non-disabled remain fairly stable at about 
43 weeks per year. Disabled individuals also experienced labor supply stability through 
the 1980s with an average of 25 weeks worked and a peak of about 27 weeks in 1988. 
This five-month difference in average annual employment between the two groups is 
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significant in its own right. However, despite no material change for the non-disabled in 
the 1990s, the gap between the non-disabled and disabled grew substantially, with 
average weeks worked among the disabled declining from 23 to 18 between 1991 and 
1995. 
Figure 3: Average annual weeks worked by disability status (1981 - 1995) 
 
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
 
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the time series for real wages and salaries (measured in 
constant 2000 dollars), showing annual earnings and earnings per annual hours worked. 
Figure 4 depicts real income increases for both the disabled and non-disabled 
populations, which follow the same general pattern, albeit with an unusually sharp 
increase for the earnings of the disabled in 1996. Unless the 1996 jump represents some 
delayed ADA-induced improvement, Figure 4 provides little evidence that the ADA had 
any appreciable effect on relative wages of the male household heads in our sample. 
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Figure 4: Conditional average real annual wages by disability status (1981 - 
1996) 
 
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
 
Figure 5, which plots the average hourly real wage for both groups, reveals that 
the non-disabled earned about $2.30 more during the 1980s. Unlike the time path for 
annual earnings, hourly wages converge substantially by 1993 but diverge in 1995.  
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Figure 5: Conditional average real hourly wages by disability status (1981 - 1995) 
 
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
 
Figures 2 through 5 offer an overall sense of the relative labor market 
performance of the disabled over time, but to assess better the causal impact of the ADA, 
one must control for individual characteristics that affect employment and wages and that 
are correlated with disability (or at least the propensity to report a disability) as well as 
for other factors that may have differential impact on the disabled over time. The 
following section will use our individual-level panel data to illuminate how the ADA 
influenced the employment and earnings of the disabled.  
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IV. Empirical Results 
 
A. Employment Status 
 
We begin our regression analysis of the ADA’s effect on labor market outcomes 
for the disabled population with an empirical model for employment status. Using a 
difference-in-differences framework, we determine whether the legislation impacted 
changes in the year-to-year probability that a non-disabled individual was employed 
relative to a disabled person. Thus, the general empirical specification is: 
∑∑
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=
−
++∗+∗+=
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j itj
J
j itjitit IdisIdisEmployed jj 81 8082 810 ελβδβ                         (1) 
where i and t index individuals and years, respectively; Ij is an indicator for each year; J is 
the maximum year of observation for the relevant dependent variable; and disit takes the 
value one when the individual is disabled and zero otherwise. Each of the coefficients β 
on the sixteen interaction terms represents the difference-in-differences (“DD”) estimator 
for a given year relative to 1981. Although Equation (1) generates raw DDs, we can 
improve on this stark model by in two ways. First, we add a vector of covariates that 
influence employment outcomes. Second, in our fully specified model, we add controls 
for individual fixed effects.23 This procedure essentially differences out factors specific to 
each individual that remain constant across time. The estimation process thus compares 
annual DDs with respect to the individual rather than across the pooled set of records for 
each year. The data underlying all regressions in this section are from the unrestricted set. 
Equation (1) represents a linear specification for the difference-in-differences 
estimator whenever the dependent variable is continuous. The logistic equivalent to this 
model without fixed effects estimates the effects of the ADA using all 18,342 individuals, 
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while the inclusion of fixed effects (conditional logit) reduces the sample size by about 
25% to 13,760 persons.24  
Note that the PSID employment status question indentifies this status only at the 
time of the PSID interview, which can lead to imprecision in our estimates.25 To 
understand this point, consider a respondent A, employed from January through May, at 
which time she lost her job, and respondent B who was unemployed the entire year. A and 
B will be observationally equivalent with respect to the employment status question as 
long as A is interviewed after the May job loss. Sample attrition and the crudeness of the 
employment status question prompt us to consider an alternative measure. 
Table 3 displays estimates from equation (1) when Employedit is measured as the 
number of weeks worked per year. PSID interviewers generate this variable through 
retrospective questions; in other words, respondents reveal how many weeks they worked 
in year t during an interview in year t + 1. Because these data are not available in the 
1997 annual file, the observation period ends in 1995. The first column of Table 3 shows 
a strong and increasing disparity in annual weeks worked for the disabled beginning in 
1993, the year after the ADA first became effective.26 Relative to 1981, disabled workers 
were employed between one and two months less than non-disabled laborers in the period 
1993-1995. Adding controls in the second column increases the magnitude of the DD 
estimates from 1993 to 1995 (in absolute value) while also suggesting an earlier ADA 
effect dating to 1990, the year of enactment. However, once we control for individual 
fixed effects, the point estimates fall by about one half and are significant only in 1994 
and 1995. Therefore, the regression analysis in Table 3 appears to validate the casual 
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observation from Figure 3 that employment levels among the disabled declined following 
enactment of the ADA. 
In contrast to the regressions analyzing wage differentials, we do not restrict the 
dependent variable in Table 3 to non-zero values. (About 7% of the observations used in 
the unrestricted dataset indicate no weeks worked.) For most empirical analyses in which 
the values of the dependent variable cluster around zero, OLS yields biased coefficient 
estimates. Nevertheless, because the DD methodology merely estimates differences in 
averages (unadjusted in Column 1 and adjusted in Columns 2 and 3), the presence of zero 
observations does not contaminate the coefficients on the interaction terms.  
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Table 3: Annual Weeks Worked, Unrestricted Dataset (1981 – 1995) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Disabled * 1982 -2.10
*
 
(1.28) 
-1.78 
(1.18) 
-0.26 
(1.02) 
Disabled * 1983 0.18 (1.32) 
1.12 
(1.24) 
2.48** 
(1.16) 
Disabled * 1984 0.98 (1.38) 
0.15 
(1.27) 
0.99 
(1.17) 
Disabled * 1985 1.07 (1.47) 
0.86 
(1.37) 
0.86 
(1.2) 
Disabled * 1986 -0.58 (1.57) 
-1.41 
(1.48) 
-0.11 
(1.35) 
Disabled * 1987 0.58 (1.52) 
-0.43 
(1.39) 
0.67 
(1.32) 
Disabled * 1988 1.36 (1.55) 
0.74 
(1.43) 
0.55 
(1.30) 
Disabled * 1989 0.85 (1.55) 
-0.53 
(1.41) 
-0.50 
(1.32) 
Disabled * 1990 -1.89 (1.51) 
-2.94** 
(1.39) 
-0.81 
(1.29) 
Disabled * 1991 -2.18 (1.53) 
-3.34** 
(1.41) 
-1.01 
(1.30) 
Disabled * 1992 -1.73 (1.49) 
-3.11** 
(1.37) 
-0.51 
(1.28) 
Disabled * 1993 -4.18
***
 
(1.54) 
-4.98*** 
(1.44) 
-0.93 
(1.36) 
Disabled * 1994 -6.56
***
 
(1.55) 
-6.75*** 
(1.48) 
-3.35** 
(1.41) 
Disabled * 1995 -7.21
***
 
(1.63) 
-7.51*** 
(1.52) 
-3.64** 
(1.46) 
Covariates 
included? No Yes Yes 
Fixed  
effects? No No Yes 
N 56,400 55,341 55,341 
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 
Notes: * = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, and *** = significant at the 1% 
level. Column 1 coefficients are difference-in-difference estimates from equation (1) when Employedit is 
measured as weeks worked per year. Column 2 adds time-varying covariates to equation (1) and Column 3 
adds time-varying covariates and individual fixed-effects to equation (1). Estimates are based on the 
unrestricted sample, and all standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 
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B. Annual Earnings 
Section 102 of the ADA prohibits not only hiring bias against the disabled but 
also discrimination “against a qualified individual with a disability because of the 
disability of such individual in regard to . . . employee compensation . . . and other terms, 
conditions, and privileges of employment.” Thus, if the law served its intended protective 
function, we should not observe a significant difference between changes in relative 
wages. Unlike the approach taken with annual weeks worked, we regress annual earnings 
on our DD interaction terms conditional on receiving positive wages. Since detecting 
wage discrimination depends on comparisons of individuals receiving a non-zero wage, 
the empirical strategy of Table 4 requires exclusion of zero-wage observations. 
In the next two sections, we estimate the model: 
∑∑
=
−
=
−
++∗+∗+=
J
j itj
J
j itjitit IdisIdisEarnings jj 81 8082 810 ελβδβ                         (2) 
where Earningsit represents either annual or hourly wages. As in our analysis of 
employment levels, estimates for the baseline model captured by (2) are given in the first 
column, while successive controls for individual time-varying characteristics and fixed 
effects are added in Columns 2 and 3, respectively. 
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Table 4: Conditional Annual Wages Earned, Unrestricted Dataset (1981 – 1996) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Disabled * 1982 746.34 (1621.09) 
-250.37 
(1526.88) 
-2154.84 
(1514.88) 
Disabled * 1983 -1439.19 (1559.51) 
-1515.24 
(1524.29) 
-1345.93 
(1404.43) 
Disabled * 1984 -677.34 (1593.68) 
-2422.66 
(1546.76) 
-2767.64* 
(1424.52) 
Disabled * 1985 -1327.12 (2081.52) 
-3586.90* 
(1931.97) 
-1477.31 
(2170.44) 
Disabled * 1986 -1466.81 (2165.08) 
-3489.78* 
(2006.62) 
-3396.85 
(2280.00) 
Disabled * 1987 -2292.60 (1999.33) 
-5075.32*** 
(1846.41) 
-2669.00 
(2258.61) 
Disabled * 1988 1277.12 (2969.06) 
-868.92 
(2754.10) 
-2713.09 
(2353.06) 
Disabled * 1989 -472.67 (1851.57) 
-3015.72* 
(1747.91) 
-3031.66 
(2016.83) 
Disabled * 1990 -1230.19 (1638.32) 
-2293.60 
(1609.82) 
-1958.07 
(2459.95) 
Disabled * 1991 -1305.43 (1934.78) 
-2493.43 
(1767.57) 
-2453.83 
(2314.18) 
Disabled * 1992 2092.27 (2052.83) 
-547.28 
(1898.40) 
-261.97 
(2440.80) 
Disabled * 1993 -3601.38
*
 
(2049.20) 
-6316.76*** 
(1875.92) 
-4472.93* 
(2388.32) 
Disabled * 1994 -1341.10 (2094.54) 
-3886.13* 
(2065.29) 
-2716.29 
(2395.19) 
Disabled * 1995 -4185.18
*
 
(2164.31) 
-4293.32** 
(1930.05) 
-3075.65 
(2318.36) 
Disabled * 1996 2903.04 (5285.71) 
1553.52 
(5297.91) 
478.99 
(5242.35) 
Covariates 
included? No Yes Yes 
Fixed  
effects? No No Yes 
N 54,191 53,049 53,049 
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.  
Notes: * = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, and *** = significant at the 1% 
level. Column 1 coefficients are difference-in-difference estimates from equation (2) where Earningsit is 
measured as dollars per year. Column 2 adds time-varying covariates to equation (2) and Column 3 adds 
time-varying covariates and individual fixed-effects to equation (2). Estimates are based on the unrestricted 
sample, and all standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 
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Although the signs of the point estimates in all three columns of Table 4 suggest a 
relative decline in wages among the disabled, no clear and sustained pattern of ADA 
influence emerges as with weeks worked. The emergence of mild statistical significance 
over time contrasts sharply with the results in Table 3. Based on these estimates, the 
unrestricted data do not support the proposition that the ADA caused relative wages for 
disabled workers to deteriorate, although 1993 appears again to be an unusually bad year 
for disabled workers. The absence of a sustained pattern in wage differentials, combined 
with the positive coefficients in all three models for 1996, suggests (in keeping with 
Figure 4) that the wage gap might have started closing in the mid-1990s. Whether this 
narrowing trend continued into the current century cannot be determined until additional 
data become available. 
C. Hourly Earnings 
Measurements of earnings power based solely on annual income may tell a 
different story than measurements based on hourly wage rates. Dividing annual earnings 
by the number of hours worked may refine our empirical understanding of earnings 
differences between disabled and non-disabled workers.  
As Table 5 shows, there is no evidence from our difference-in-differences 
estimates that disabled persons experienced an ADA-induced change in relative hourly 
wages. Consistent with a pattern observed earlier in Figure 5, the disabled experienced a 
notable (albeit short-lived) hourly wage increase relative to the non-disabled in 1993. 
Although this was the largest change in absolute value over the entire observation period, 
the 1993 change was still not statistically significant in any of the three models. 
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The evidence in this section is consistent with the following conclusions: First, 
the ADA had a negative impact on the employment levels of the disabled relative to the 
non-disabled. The fact that our data extend back to the early 1980s helps rule out the 
possibility that the employment declines that we observe (and that were found in other 
recent studies) originated prior to the adoption of the ADA. Second, the ADA did not 
cause any appreciable decline in the wages of disabled workers (relative to the 
nondisabled). In other words, it would appear that the ADA did not induce a simple 
adverse shift in the demand for disabled workers, since this would result in both a decline 
in employment and a reduction in the wages of disabled workers. Rather, the initial 
evidence from our unrestricted sample would be consistent with a story in which, perhaps 
most notably when the ADA took effect in 1993, employers were particularly wary of 
disabled workers (perhaps out of concern that the law would impose onerous burdens on 
employers), but that disabled workers who did secure employment retained their previous 
level of hourly wages. In the next section, we consider whether these tentative 
conclusions remain robust when we eliminate compositional changes in the sample of 
workers. 
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Table 5: Conditional Hourly Wages Earned, Unrestricted Dataset (1981 – 1995) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Disabled * 1982 0.65 (1.10) 
0.42 
(1.10) 
-0.79 
(1.10) 
Disabled * 1983 -0.76 (0.84) 
-1.02 
(0.83) 
-1.45* 
(0.78) 
Disabled * 1984 0.37 (1.02) 
-0.40 
(1.03) 
-0.74 
(0.97) 
Disabled * 1985 -0.06 (1.05) 
-1.31 
(1.00) 
-0.36 
(1.32) 
Disabled * 1986 -0.14 (1.14) 
-1.02 
(1.06) 
-1.08 
(1.29) 
Disabled * 1987 -1.27 (1.07) 
-1.98** 
(1.01) 
-1.35 
(1.40) 
Disabled * 1988 1.55 (1.72) 
0.75 
(1.62) 
-0.11 
(1.44) 
Disabled * 1989 -0.11 (1.13) 
-0.85 
(1.09) 
-1.30 
(1.29) 
Disabled * 1990 -0.62 (0.82) 
-0.76 
(0.81) 
-0.94 
(1.29) 
Disabled * 1991 -0.93 (0.99) 
-1.27 
(0.95) 
-1.69 
(1.41) 
Disabled * 1992 -0.18 (1.94) 
-1.07 
(1.93) 
-0.03 
(1.67) 
Disabled * 1993 2.34 (3.09) 
1.64 
(3.08) 
1.44 
(3.84) 
Disabled * 1994 1.52 (1.45) 
1.40 
(1.50) 
0.19 
(1.83) 
Disabled * 1995 -1.73 (2.10) 
-1.64 
(2.06) 
-1.19 
(2.33) 
Covariates 
included? No Yes Yes 
Fixed  
effects? No No Yes 
N 45,259 44,469 44,469 
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.  
Notes: * = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, and *** = significant at the 1% 
level. Column 1 coefficients are difference-in-difference estimates from equation (2) where Earningsit is 
measured as dollars per hour. Column 2 adds time-varying covariates to equation (2) and Column 3 adds 
time-varying covariates and individual fixed-effects to equation (2). Estimates are based on the unrestricted 
sample, and all standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 
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V. Analyzing the Restricted Sample 
 
In this section, we restrict the data to include only those individuals who appear 
each year for the entire observation period. In Section IV, the baseline regressions 
without individual fixed effects counted persons whether or not they appeared in the 
reference year 1981. Thus, for example, the difference-in-differences estimate for 1994 
may have been calculated using information on an interview respondent who first 
appeared in 1988. Consequently, the logic of the regression exercise would be 
confounded by this compositional change, especially if the individuals appearing after 
1981 significantly altered the relative numbers of disabled persons in the data. The 
inclusion of individual fixed effects in the most fully specified model ameliorated the 
“anchoring” problem by requiring that all individuals appear in 1981. Otherwise the 
regression would drop the entire set of observations for that person. Still, the unrestricted 
data permitted potentially troublesome compositional changes as some workers dropped 
out of the sample over time. For example, even if two individuals, A and B, initially 
appeared continuously from 1981, but B contributed to estimates for three more years 
than A because B was interviewed three more times than A, estimates from those three 
years would not be fully comparable with the preceding results. The restricted dataset 
precludes compositional change by including only those persons that appear for the same 
(maximum) duration. As discussed in Section III, the restricted sample contains the 
employment and wage histories of 1437 PSID respondents from 1981 to 1996, of whom 
553 were identified as “disabled” for at least one year during the 16 years of data. 
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The first column of Table 6 initially suggests an even more robust decline in 
disabled employment levels than Table 3, as the magnitudes of the last three estimates in 
Column 1 range from -5.7 to -8.6. But this story changes dramatically when one adds 
demographic covariates (Column 2) or controls for individual fixed effects (Column 3). 
Thus, if one accepts the proposition that the restricted dataset permits cleaner 
comparisons of individuals across time, i.e., it maximizes the value of the PSID’s 
longitudinal structure, particularly when controlling for individual fixed effects, then 
Table 6 provides persuasive evidence against a depressive employment effect from the 
ADA. Moreover, the vast majority of point estimates (11 of 14) in Column 3 are 
positively signed, though not statistically significant at standard levels. This result 
suggests that, at least relative to 1981, male disabled household heads were not suffering 
employment losses (even if there may be some indication from Table 6 that any 
improvements were weakening in the 1990s). 
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Table 6: Annual Weeks Worked, Restricted Dataset (1981 – 1995) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Disabled * 1982 -0.72 (3.04) 
-1.20 
(2.98) 
0.98 
(2.59) 
Disabled * 1983 -0.40 (3.06) 
-0.10 
(3.02) 
2.17 
(2.77) 
Disabled * 1984 1.31 (2.93) 
1.87 
(2.93) 
2.71 
(2.49) 
Disabled * 1985 -0.76 (3.33) 
0.18 
(3.47) 
0.78 
(3.11) 
Disabled * 1986 -3.82 (3.64) 
-2.53 
(3.81) 
-0.78 
(3.34) 
Disabled * 1987 -0.01 (3.20) 
1.55 
(3.34) 
2.86 
(3.06) 
Disabled * 1988 -0.57 (3.10) 
1.99 
(3.32) 
3.07 
(2.74) 
Disabled * 1989 0.08 (2.93) 
3.24 
(3.27) 
3.70 
(2.76) 
Disabled * 1990 -5.12 (3.27) 
-1.26 
(3.62) 
0.21 
(3.00) 
Disabled * 1991 -6.32
*
 
(3.36) 
-2.06 
(3.80) 
-1.51 
(3.10) 
Disabled * 1992 -1.51 (3.21) 
2.85 
(3.67) 
2.48 
(2.95) 
Disabled * 1993 -5.66
*
 
(3.30) 
0.36 
(3.95) 
1.54 
(3.28) 
Disabled * 1994 -8.35
**
 
(3.52) 
-2.19 
(4.28) 
-1.11 
(3.52) 
Disabled * 1995 -8.62
**
 
(3.62) 
-0.16 
(4.47) 
1.36 
(3.70) 
Covariates 
included? No Yes Yes 
Fixed  
effects? No No Yes 
N 8938 8912 8912 
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.  
Notes: * = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, and *** = significant at the 1% 
level. Column 1 coefficients are difference-in-difference estimates from equation (1) when Employedit is 
measured as weeks worked per year. Column 2 adds time-varying covariates to equation (1) and Column 3 
adds time-varying covariates and individual fixed-effects to equation (1). Estimates are based on the 
restricted sample, and all standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 
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Table 7 examines the impact of the ADA on annual earnings for the restricted 
sample and finds, as was the case in the unrestricted sample, that there are no consistent 
patterns of change in the relative wages of disabled workers that can be confidently 
ascribed to the ADA. Once again, 1993 stands out as an unusually bad year for the 
disabled with earnings shortfalls (relative to 1981) ranging from $10,000 (Column 1) to 
$5000 (Column 3).  
With the large year-to-year swings in the various estimated effects and the 
generally statistically insignificant coefficients, though, the conclusions one can draw 
from this Table 7 are uncertain. On the one hand, the poor outcomes in 1993 suggest a 
story in which the ADA damaged the earnings profile for the disabled by a substantial 
amount. A year later, however, circumstances seemed to improve substantially. Might 
this suggest that employer fears about the possible costs of the ADA initially caused them 
to shun disabled workers, but that this initial effect was quickly overturned? On the other 
hand, the return to substantial (though insignificant) disparities in 1995 and 1996 may 
suggest that 1994 was simply an outlier. Still, 1996 does not look all that different from 
1987 in terms of the relative earnings of the disabled, which may suggest that forces other 
than the ADA primarily drove the apparent deterioration in the earnings of the disabled. 
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Table 7: Conditional Annual Wages Earned, Restricted Dataset (1981 – 1996) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Disabled * 1982 39.15 (2961.84) 
-1052.64 
(2772.77) 
-2782.06 
(2332.88) 
Disabled * 1983 -4719.64
*
 
(2758.93) 
-4221.60 
(2739.45) 
-1714.85 
(2068.69) 
Disabled * 1984 -2745.25 (2583.90) 
-2610.32 
(2715.76) 
-1746.00 
(2073.51) 
Disabled * 1985 -7072.15
**
 
(3431.43) 
-5604.07* 
(3038.50) 
-1348.42 
(4222.21) 
Disabled * 1986 -5275.17 (3801.62) 
-2668.13 
(3500.84) 
-1348.96 
(4160.80) 
Disabled * 1987 -8634.13
**
 
(3750.00) 
-6209.00* 
(3318.33) 
-3076.81 
(4332.98) 
Disabled * 1988 -7146.01
*
 
(4111.81) 
-5002.83 
(3691.88) 
-2901.21 
(4345.29) 
Disabled * 1989 -4471.59 (3375.95) 
-2798.21 
(3315.48) 
-4129.82 
(3694.59) 
Disabled * 1990 -5970.43
*
 
(3230.28) 
-2613.86 
(3351.33) 
-2326.68 
(4784.707) 
Disabled * 1991 -8632.74
**
 
(3717.52) 
-5330.25 
(3413.56) 
-3546.62 
(4074.81) 
Disabled * 1992 -5749.60 (4376.94) 
-5105.32 
(4270.72) 
-3621.80 
(4546.63) 
Disabled * 1993 -10,357.58
**
 
(4126.61) 
-7234.62* 
(3823.49) 
-5256.63 
(4295.34) 
Disabled * 1994 -4135.76 (4660.38) 
-911.29 
(4592.39) 
-1517.86 
(4131.87) 
Disabled * 1995 -9655.74
**
 
(4548.16) 
-5885.46 
(4355.23) 
-4675.97 
(3755.64) 
Disabled * 1996 -5379.76 (4367.12) 
-3067.75 
(4586.23) 
-5261.67 
(4574.79) 
Covariates 
included? No Yes Yes 
Fixed  
effects? No No Yes 
N 19,762 19,648 19,648 
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.  
Notes: * = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, and *** = significant at the 1% 
level. Column 1 coefficients are difference-in-difference estimates from equation (2) where Earningsit is 
measured as dollars per year. Column 2 adds time-varying covariates to equation (2) and Column 3 adds 
time-varying covariates and individual fixed-effects to equation (2). Estimates are based on the unrestricted 
sample, and all standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 
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Figure 6: Number disabled in the restricted sample by year (1981 - 1996) 
 
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 
 
One explanation for why the Column 1 estimates in Table 7 display a significant 
downward wage effect while Column 3 does not might be differential self-reports of 
disability status over time. Figure 6 plots the number of individuals reporting a disability 
among the 532 people in the restricted sample who reported a disability at least once but 
not for the entire observation period. Among these individuals, we do observe changes in 
self-identification that may have been influenced by the ADA’s passage (or modifications 
to Social Security and other transfer payments). Since our constant restricted sample 
naturally ages over time, the overall trend in the number reporting a disability increases 
as one might expect. However, with the exception of the 1986-1987 change (which 
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should be discounted because of data reporting problems in 1986), the 1992-1993 
increase represents the largest jump in our data. In fact, from 1993 through 1996 the 
number never drops below 200, which is 38% of the 532 “sometimes-disabled” 
population. This post-1992 spike might be attributed to hopes that the ADA would 
benefit people who claim a disability then. Thus, when we control for individual fixed 
effects in Column 3, we capture the probable fact that those reporting a disability have 
better outcomes overall regardless of whether they claim to be disabled in a given year. 
Table 8 estimates the hourly wage effects of the ADA, again using the restricted 
sample. While the unrestricted data yielded no evidence of a sustained ADA impact on 
the hourly wages of the disabled, the same regressions estimated on the restricted set does 
suggest an adverse ADA impact on hourly wages (note again the adverse estimate in 
1993). But when one looks at the timing of these adverse wage shifts, the link to the 
ADA becomes less clear. For example, controlling for individual fixed effects in Column 
3 reveals an adverse trend in hourly wages for the disabled, but one that begins in 1986, 
well before the ADA became law. While relative real hourly wages of the disabled fell by 
about $6 beginning in 1992, such disparity first appears in 1986 as a $4 shortfall relative 
to the non-disabled in 1981. Since the series of negative point estimates remains rather 
consistent from the pre-ADA period through 1994, we cannot readily attribute the decline 
in hourly wages to the legislation itself. Moreover, though one might conclude that the 
early days of the ADA did not boost the hourly wages of the disabled, the estimates for 
1995 suggest some positive news regarding earnings. Might this suggest that a decade of 
earnings erosion for the disabled, initially caused by forces in the American labor market 
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other than the ADA, was beginning to reverse in 1995, or is this just another ephemeral 
swing? 
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Table 8: Conditional Hourly Wages Earned, Restricted Dataset (1981 – 1995) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Disabled * 1982 0.01 (2.07) 
-0.64 
(2.06) 
-1.25 
(2.33) 
Disabled * 1983 -2.30 (1.71) 
-2.59 
(1.64) 
-3.37 
(2.16) 
Disabled * 1984 1.08 (3.33) 
0.40 
(3.25) 
-0.72 
(2.90) 
Disabled * 1985 0.19 (2.32) 
-1.22 
(2.28) 
-0.79 
(2.18) 
Disabled * 1986 -2.72 (2.66) 
-2.63 
(2.48) 
-4.27** 
(1.92) 
Disabled * 1987 -2.15 (1.99) 
-2.71 
(1.87) 
-5.26*** 
(1.90) 
Disabled * 1988 -0.90 (2.41) 
-1.24 
(2.33) 
-2.88 
(2.55) 
Disabled * 1989 -2.62 (1.94) 
-3.12 
(1.95) 
-4.48** 
(2.24) 
Disabled * 1990 -2.89 (1.87) 
-3.52* 
(1.93) 
-5.03** 
(2.31) 
Disabled * 1991 0.62 (2.97) 
1.30 
(2.89) 
-2.96 
(2.60) 
Disabled * 1992 -3.58 (2.29) 
-3.65 
(2.29) 
-6.34** 
(2.98) 
Disabled * 1993 -5.44
**
 
(2.46) 
-6.30** 
(2.48) 
-6.54** 
(2.90) 
Disabled * 1994 -3.91 (2.68) 
-4.50 
(2.74) 
-6.22* 
(3.26) 
Disabled * 1995 1.59 (9.48) 
0.82 
(9.21) 
0.38 
(8.32) 
Covariates 
included? No Yes Yes 
Fixed  
effects? No No Yes 
N 7194 7169 7169 
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.  
Notes: * = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, and *** = significant at the 1% 
level. Column 1 coefficients are difference-in-difference estimates from equation (2) where Earningsit is 
measured as dollars per hour. Column 2 adds time-varying covariates to equation (2) and Column 3 adds 
time-varying covariates and individual fixed-effects to equation (2). Estimates are based on the restricted 
sample, and all standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 
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V1. Conclusion 
 
This article has offered new evidence on the relationship between the Americans 
with Disabilities Act and the labor market fortunes of the class protected by its landmark 
provisions. Using individual-level longitudinal data from 1981 to 1996 from the PSID, a 
previously unexamined source, we examine the annual number of weeks worked, annual 
earnings, and hourly wages on a full sample of 7120 unique male household heads 
between the ages of 21 and 65 (a total of 64,607 person-year observations) and a 
“restricted” sample of 1437 individuals appearing each year from 1981 to 1986. The 
conflicting pictures that emerge from the analyses of these two different samples sheds 
new light on, but also counsels caution in reaching final conclusions about, the economic 
impact of the ADA. 
While our analysis of the unrestricted sample suggested the ADA had a negative 
impact on the employment levels of the disabled relative to the non-disabled but no 
impact on relative earnings, our evaluation of the restricted sample raised questions about 
these findings. For the restricted sample—in which we look at the identical 1437 workers 
over our entire sample period—we see little evidence of adverse effects on weeks worked 
in our individual fixed effects model, but strong evidence of wage declines for the 
disabled, albeit one that began in 1986, well prior to the adoption of the ADA. 
The restricted data set enables us to see how the identical set of 1147 workers fare 
over our 1981-1996 data period. Recall that 884 of these workers were never disabled 
over this timeframe, 21 were always disabled, and the remaining 242 workers move in 
and out of what the PSID identifies as a “disabled” condition. The restricted sample has 
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the considerable advantage of protecting against biases caused by law-induced changes in 
self-identified disability status, but this benefit comes with two costs.  First, the relatively 
small sample size necessarily generates higher standard errors in our restricted sample 
estimates that make it hard to distinguish statistically insignificant effects from true non-
effects.  Second, by focusing on more mature workers at the time of ADA enactment, we 
miss what is happening to new entrants to the labor market.  Thus, workers who already 
have jobs (or at least more job experience) when the ADA comes into effect may be in a 
different position than those coming into the labor market for the first time.   
Our analysis also underscores once again the difficult employment situation 
confronted by the average male household head with a disability, one which, at least 
given our admittedly imprecisely measured definition of disability, has not seen major 
and sustained improvements during the post-ADA years. On the other hand, this article 
provides evidence that the more mature workers who were found in every year of our 
sample did not suffer the same disemployment effects that previous empirical analyses 
have attributed to the ADA.   
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1
 In this article, efficacy is calibrated using econometrically measurable outcomes. An interesting issue is 
whether a narrow focus on the measured wages and employment data fully captures important but harder to 
quantify effects relating to the overarching purpose of civil rights laws in transforming social attitudes. For 
a discussion of this broader issue within the context of disability law, see Stein (2004b). 
2
 To be considered qualified, individuals must be capable of performing the essential job functions of the 
positions they seek, either with or without the provision of reasonable accommodations. For an overview of 
the reasonable accommodation mandate, see Stein (2003). 
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3
 This disregard led Richard Burkhauser to criticize the ADA’s lack of conjoined work initiatives by 
contrasting various European policies directed toward “transferring” people with disabilities from social 
welfare networks into the workforce (Burkhauser, 1997; Burkhauser and Hirvonen, 1989). 
4
 The Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 extended the length of time that 
people with disabilities receiving public assistance could continue to receive health care coverage after 
obtaining gainful employment. On July 26, 2000 (the ADA’s tenth anniversary) the Clinton Administration 
announced a series of policy initiatives to allow disabled people receiving Social Security disability-related 
benefits to earn additional income without losing cash benefits. 
5
 For a description by one of the failed effort to enact a federal jobs program for the disabled by one it its 
congressional supporters, see Dole (1994).  
6
 For an overview of the treaty and its implications, see Stein (2007). 
7
 The PSID maintains annual family-level data files from the program’s inception in 1968 through 1997 
after which they appear biennially through 2007. 
8
 The PSID does add new individuals to the overall “roster”; for example the children of original 1968 
interviewed household heads. Our unrestricted dataset generates some compositional change as older 
workers drop out of our sample, but to be included in any given year’s coefficient estimate, one must have 
a 1981 observation for comparison, so we are not adding new workers at the time of ADA adoption. Our 
restricted dataset, however, focuses on a static group of individuals, i.e., those who appear each year from 
1981 through 1996. 
9
 Several studies, which are referenced individually, are collected in Stapleton and Burkhauser (2003). Two 
important articles predating the post-ADA effect studies are Collignon (1997) and Kirchner (1996). 
Electronic versions of some of the above studies, as well as continuing research in this field, are posted on 
the Cornell University ILR School Employment and Disability Institute homepage, 
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/edi/m-pubs.cfm. 
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10
 Two other studies that bear noting are Epstein (1992), which foretold a detrimental effect in advance of 
the ADA becoming operational, and Jolls (2000), which analyzed Epstein’s assertions using a price-
theoretic framework. 
11
 For a prominent example, see Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
12
 See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999), in which the Supreme Court 
acknowledged the potential overlap between individuals deemed disabled under the ADA and those 
construed as such under the Social Security system. 
13
 The question is: “Do you/Does anyone in this household) have a health problem or disability which 
prevents (you/them) from working or which limits the kind or amount of work (you/they) can do?,” and the 
possible answers are “Yes” or “No.” 
14
 The SIPP will only register an individual’s disability if it existed before June-September of the first 
interview year (depending on the rotation group to which the individual was assigned). 
15
 We are able to track household head responses consistently across time by arranging a string of 
household interview numbers in the individual-level set in chronological order and then merging this data 
with it. 
16
 Male household heads comprise about 75% of all household heads. We note that Richard Burkhauser and 
his colleagues argue that PSID analysis should examine effects on men, “since their employment decline is 
much more pronounced than that of women” (Burkhauser and Schroeder, 2004). Also, “the PSID and the 
CPS, capture the same employment trends for men with disabilities over the 1980s and 1990s” (Burkhauser 
and Schroeder, 2004). 
17
 Responses to the race survey question often generate inconsistency over time; we therefore apply the 
response that appears in more than half of the individual’s total observations. 
18
 In another section of the PSID survey, however, the question posed is: “[A]re you . . . working now, 
looking for work, retired, a student, (a housewife), or what?” The responses “temporarily disabled” or 
“permanently disabled” often are coded, but were not suggested to interviewees as possible answers. The 
fact that interview participants are not prompted to consider the answer “permanently disabled” implies a 
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likely downward bias in the frequency of affirmative disability reports. As a result, we ignore the 
employment status question as a measure of disability. 
19
 In this section, we refer to summary statistics from the unrestricted data in Table 1 unless otherwise 
noted. 
20
 Requiring interviewees to recall information on employment status and earnings from the previous year 
undoubtedly introduces measurement error (due, for example, to reporting biases or imperfect recall). 
However, since these indicators are used as dependent variables in the analysis, such measurement error 
will not bias our estimates. 
21
 The older two cohorts experienced a dip in disability share in 1986 that we pursued with data analysts at 
the PSID. According to one helpful representative “[t]he only difference in 1986 compared to other waves 
is that [the work limitation questions] were asked after a series of questions on Activities of Daily Living 
(“ADLs”). This could be some kind of measurement issue—asking a global questions about whether [one 
has] a physical or nervous condition that limits the amount and type of work you do after . . . questions 
about whether you have ADLs somehow might reduce the likelihood of [one] reporting affirmatively to the 
first question.” Indeed, this is the only difference in the way the questions were asked from 1985 to 1987, 
and when the questions regarding ADLs were removed in 1987, the percentage disabled returned to levels 
consistent with the year-to-year changes from 1981 to 1985. 
22
 Figures 3 and 5 only include observations through 1995, because the necessary data are not available in 
1996. 
23
 A variance inflation factor test run after each regression confirms that none of the difference-in-
differences estimates is affected by multicollinearity. We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.  
24
 Exactly 4581 persons drop out of our sample when fixed effects are included because these individuals 
experienced no variation in employment status across their observation span and thus do not contribute to 
the regression estimates. 
25
 According to the PSID, “[t]he interview period (field season) is roughly between March and November, 
with 1993 and 1994 being exceptions and going into December.” 
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26
 We focus on 1993 as an important year for observing ADA-related changes in our dependent variables 
because, although the ADA’s first effective date was 1992 (for firms with at least twenty-five employees). 
We allow for a one-year lag to capture any potential employment and wage effects. For similar reasons, 
1995 represents another crucial observation date since the ADA’s coverage extended to firms with at least 
fifteen employees in 1994.  
  
